One of the most defining features of modern financial networks is their inherent complex and intertwined structure. In particular the often observed core-periphery structure plays a prominent role. Here we study and quantify the impact that the complexity of networks has on contagion effects and system stability, and our focus is on the channel of default contagion that describes the spread of initial distress via direct balance sheet exposures. We present a general approach describing the financial network by a random graph, where we distinguish vertices (institutions) of different types -for example core/periphery -and let edge probabilities and weights (exposures) depend on the types of both the receiving and the sending vertex. Our main result allows to compute explicitly the systemic damage caused by some initial local shock event, and we derive a complete characterization of resilient respectively non-resilient financial systems. Due to the random graphs approach these results bear a considerable robustness to local uncertainties and small changes of the network structure over time. In particular, it is possible to condense the precise micro-structure of the network to macroscopic statistics. Applications of our theory demonstrate that indeed the features captured by our model can have significant impact on system stability; we derive resilience conditions for the global network based on subnetwork conditions only.
Introduction
Modern financial networks of counterparty exposures are characterized by a huge intrinsic complexity. One example for this are cross-border relations that have emerged over the last decades in the course of globalization [12, 20, 32, 39] . While the possibility of making business on an international level certainly provides benefits to single institutions by facilitating diversification and giving access to different markets [1, 4, 5, 6, 21, 25] , the convoluted trans-border dependencies can also pose a great threat to the global system and increase so-called systemic risk. The financial crisis in the years 2007/08 is a striking example of how an initially locally confined shock -the burst of the US housing bubble -had a catastrophic impact on the economy worldwide. In addition to cross-border exposures connecting various subsystems, modern financial networks also exhibit a distinctive tiered structure -usually referred to as core-periphery Figure 1 : A sample network consisting of two cores (darkblue resp. darkgreen) and the associated peripheries (lightblue resp. lightgreen). Vertex sizes correspond to the respective degrees. For simplicity the network is depicted undirected and the strength of links is omitted.
structure -that can arise in many different shapes; see [9] for Austria, [16] for Brazil, [19] for Germany, [28] for Italy, [36] for the Netherlands, [38] for the UK, and [2] for the European interbank network. Figure 1 illustrates a sample network of interdependencies between two cores and their corresponding peripheries reflecting the above mentioned complexity of financial networks. It is an important research question to model and understand how these complex network configurations influence the stability of financial systems.
It is well understood that propagation of systemic risk is caused by various direct or indirect effects in the system, see e. g. [34] . One important direct channel that we focus on here is the so-called default contagion. Also known as balance sheet contagion, this channel of systemic risk describes the propagation of distress between institutions that are linked via direct balance sheet exposures such as loans. If an institution in the system cannot meet the contractually stipulated obligations, distress gets passed on to its creditors as they lose some of their interbank assets.
Prominent work in the field of default contagion is the Eisenberg-Noe [24] model for which existence of a unique vector that clears all liabilities between members of a given system is established. Extensions of this model incorporate bankruptcy costs and other effects [31, 41, 44] . The authors in [11] apply matrix majorization techniques to the actual observed financial network to estimate the systemic loss based on some measure of liability concentration. In [30] the authors develop a Bayesian methodology for estimating the liability matrix based on aggregated values and apply their method to stress testing in an extended Eisenberg-Noe framework. Under the assumption of zero recovery rate the authors of [13] use a Bayesian network approach to derive formulas for the joint default of institutions.
All the works mentioned above -and several others -develop tools to study default contagion in a specifically given financial system. There is, however, another fruitful line of research where a different perspective is taken in the following sense. Instead of considering a concrete system configuration, a whole ensemble of financial networks is described by means of a random graph and it is assumed that the observed network is a typical member of this family. This can be achieved by calibrating the random graph's distribution to macroscopic statistical properties of the observed network, such as the distributions of the degrees and the balance sheet exposures. Our results in this setting are then derived in terms of these global statistics only and hold for essentially the whole ensemble of random configurations. In particular, members of this family can vary significantly on a microscopic level, rendering this approach robust to local changes of the network or statistical uncertainties. Furthermore, under the premise that over time the network may change locally but keeps its global statistics, a fact that is supported empirically by [16] in the context studied here, the results are applicable also for future systems; this is a desirable property from a regulator's point of view. Additionally, as the results for contagion in random graphs are typically derived in an asymptotic way for a large number of institutions, there is a naturally emerging notion of resilience of a network that does not depend on any arbitrarily chosen parameters such as confidence values, see also Section 4 for a more detailed discussion. Within the literature on financial networks the random graphs perspective was first introduced in [29] and carried out for the configuration model in [3] . In [34, 35] it has been extended to a version of the configuration model which allows to capture assortativity of the network. The works [22, 23] analyze default contagion on inhomogeneous random graphs.
In particular from a regulators viewpoint, it is essential to quantify the effect of the network complexity on financial contagion, especially the interplay among different clusters and tiers, e. g. multiple core-periphery structures. So far, the related previous work has depicted the effect of the heterogeneity -measured in terms of the degree distribution of the individual institutions -on default contagion. Here we go one step further and provide a systematic analysis that makes the combined effect of global network structures and heterogeneity explicit.
Contribution Our paper provides a systematic analysis of the complex network structures and a precise description of their effects on contagion and system stability by means of random graphs. More precisely, we extend previous findings in two orthogonal directions. First, we quantify the effect that different subsystems such as core/periphery, geographical location, institutional form (bank, insurance, etc.), or a combination of all of these have on contagion in the global system. In particular, the strong complexity observed in global, tiered financial systems is accounted for in our model. Moreover, our setup allows to consider liabilities -or more general exposures -between institutions that depend on the types of both the creditor and the debtor. This makes our model realistic and distinguishes this work from the previous literature [3, 23] , where in order to derive analytic results it was necessary to consider liabilities independent of the debtor institutions.
Block Model To describe different subsystems (blocks) in our model we develop a multidimensional extension of the inhomogeneous random graph in [22] , which itself is a directed extension of the Chung-Lu random graph [14] . In particular, we assign a vector of weights to each vertex (institution) in the graph that describes the tendency to develop random edges of a certain edge-weight to vertices of a certain type. Models of this type (although one-dimensional, undirected and unweighted) are sometimes -especially in the statistical physics literaturereferred to as fitness models, see [10, 30, 43] for example. As our model description strongly depends on the choice of vertex types (blocks), for calibration purposes one needs to draw on methods for detection of communities and core-periphery structure, which are well developed. See for instance [7, 15, 17, 27, 47, 48] respectively [33, 42] .
Exposure Distribution As already mentioned, the standard setting of the random-graphs approach to default contagion in the literature so far has only allowed for meaningful analytic results under the simplifying assumption that liabilities in the network only depend on the creditor banks. Just thinking of the example of a core-periphery network shows the limitations of this assumption, as liabilities between core-banks should be significantly higher than liabilities of a core-bank to a periphery-bank. In the present work we waive this assumption thus allowing for realistic liability distributions. This increases significantly the complexity of the resulting model, and our main technical contribution is a precise analysis of its relevant characteristics; see also the detailed discussion below.
Analytic Results on the Final Default Fraction and Resilience Our main contribution in this paper is the rigorous analysis of the default contagion process in our model. Our first main result Theorem 3.4 identifies bounds for the final fraction of defaulted institutions in a system hit by some arbitrarily specified initial shock. The following informal statement summarizes the main insights from Theorem 3.4.
Mock Theorem. Consider a financial network of size n ∈ N that was hit by some exogenous shock so that some of the banks are initially defaulted. Then under certain regularity assumptions there exist constants 0 ≤ k ≤ K ≤ 1 such that
where o p (1) denotes a term that vanishes as n becomes large. The constants k, K can be computed explicitly in terms of the global network statistics, and in many relevant settings k = K.
For large network sizes n, the theorem hence determines explicit bounds for the fraction of finally defaulted institutions in the system. As they only depend on the global network statistics the result is robust to statistical uncertainties on an institution level and stays true also for future points in time as long as macro-statistical properties of the system do not change much.
In direct comparison to our model, the paper [22] derives analogue results for the special case with one type of institutions only and equally sized exposures. Here, however, the analysis is much more intricate: the edge weights cannot be separated from the network skeleton anymore and become an integral part of the graph. As such they have to be incorporated in the analysis. Moreover, the vertex types require a multi-dimensional consideration.
From a regulator's viewpoint, more than merely describing the contagion process for certain shock events, it is important to understand whether today's financial system is able to absorb possible future shocks. A common approach to this question in risk management is to choose certain parameters for the initial stress and quantiles of the final damage that are deemed admissible. Our approach for large networks, however, gives rise to a parameter-free alternative: we call a system non-resilient if the final fraction of defaulted institutions is lower bounded by a positive constant no matter how small the initial shock was. That is, any small shock will start a substantial cascade. Otherwise a system is called resilient (see also [3, 22, 23] ).
Building on our description of the final default fraction, a second main contribution of this paper is to derive explicit criteria to decide whether a certain system is (non-)resilient. In this analysis we are able to differentiate between initial shocks on different subsystems; this allows us to quantify the effect of clusters and tiers for system stability and more generally to investigate which network characteristics promote the spread of distress and how global cascades can be contained. Note that the parameter-free perspective only makes sense asymptotically as for a finite system size n it is impossible to choose an initial default fraction less than n −1 . By simulations, however, we verify that our characterization is already admissible for finite systems whose empirical statistics are close to the considered asymptotic distribution.
Applications Recall that the leading question we want to study in this paper is what impact the complex intertwining of modern financial networks -such as the global connectedness and the tiered structures -has on their stability. We demonstrate by several applications that the features of our model can indeed have a significant effect on the course of the contagion process. First, we consider the influence of a non-resilient subsystem on a lager global system. We find that not only this non-resilient subpart may make the system as a whole non-resilient, but it can also cause severe damage to a priori resilient parts of the network. More crucially, we also find that a system consisting only of resilient subsystems may also become non-resilient due to cross-type (e. g. cross-border) linkages. Therefore, we further derive criteria for resilience of the global system based on conditions for the subsystems and the connectivity between them. Finally, we consider the reshuffling of exposures in a network where originally all exposures only depend on the creditor -the exposed party -such that the new network's exposures respect a core-periphery structure. We show that by this procedure an initially resilient system can become non-resilient, which stresses the importance of this capability in a model for default contagion in order not to underestimate contagion effects.
Outline The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the random graph and describe the model for default contagion. We then derive asymptotic results on the final default fraction in Section 3. In Section 4 we discuss (non-)resilience and the corresponding criteria. We then present our applications in Section 5 and perform simulations for finite networks. Finally, we provide proofs of our results in Section 6.
Default Contagion on a Random Weighted Multi-type Network
We describe a model for a financial network consisting of n ∈ N vertices (institutions) and random directed edges between them. We usually think of an institution i ∈ [n] := {1, . . . , n} ⊂ N as a bank in an interbank network and of a directed edge going from institution i ∈ [n] to j ∈ [n] as a financial exposure of j which emanates from i, for example by an outstanding interbank-loan from i to j. Our model accounts for two more features. First, we assign weights to the edges representing the amount of the loan. As will be clear from the construction in the following, the assignment of edge-weights depends on both the creditor-and the debtorinstitution. This feature is new as compared to previous literature such as [3, 23] , where the amount of each loan did only depend on the creditor bank. Second, we assign different types to the institutions in the network. This allows to describe more involved network structures such as core-periphery networks -a two-type network in our terminology -and (dis-)assortative structures.
Vertex Types
We begin by assigning to each institution i ∈ [n] a type α i ∈ [T ], where T ∈ N is the fixed number of types. In the prominent case of a core-periphery network we choose T = 2 and a bank i ∈ [n] shall be a core bank if α i = 1 resp. a periphery bank if α i = 2. Hence the financial network is partitioned into sets of institutions of different types, which we also call blocks.
Vertex Weights and Random Weighted Edges
Next, we fix R ∈ N and we construct a random network with edge-weights in [R] . To this end, assign to each institution i ∈ [n] a set {w −,r,α i , w +,r,α i } 1≤r≤R,1≤α≤T of non-negative vertexweights. Here the weight w −,r,α i describes the tendency of bank i to develop incoming edges of weight r from institutions of type α. Similarly, w +,r,α i describes the tendency of i to form outgoing edges of weight r to institutions of type α. To formalize this, let X r i,j be the indicator random variable which is 1 if there is an edge of weight r going from i to j and 0 otherwise and let X r i,j ∼ Be(p r i,j ) be a Bernoulli random variable with expectation
To avoid multiple edges of different weights between the institutions, we assume {X r i,j } 1≤r≤R to be mutually exclusive in the sense that 1≤r≤R X r i,j ≤ 1. Also, we assume that edges between different pairs of institutions are independent, i. e. X r 1 i 1 ,j 1 ⊥ X r 2 i 2 ,j 2 for all r 1 , r 2 ∈ [R] if i 1 = i 2 or j 1 = j 2 . In particular, X r 1 i,j ⊥ X r 2 j,i for all r 1 , r 2 ∈ [R], i = j. This can for example be achieved by introducing a sequence of independent random variables U i,j , each distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1], and letting X r i,j = 1 U i,j ∈ s≤r−1 p s i,j , s≤r p s i,j
. The upper bound R −1 in (2.1) then ensures that s≤R p s i,j ≤ 1.
Capital and Default Contagion
We assign to each institution i ∈ [n] an initial amount of capital (equity) c i ∈ N 0 ∪ {∞}. We call an institution solvent if c i > 0 and insolvent if c i = 0 and we denote by D 0 := {i ∈ [n] : c i = 0} the set of initially defaulted institutions. The initial default shall be due to some exogenous event such as a stock market crash. Because of the interconnections in the network the default of the institutions in D 0 will spread through the network. This happens since the defaulted banks cannot (fully) repay their loans to their creditors. As first suggested in [29] it is a reasonable assumption that defaulted debtors cannot repay any of their debts since processing their default may take months or even years while financial contagion is a short term process. In fact one can generalize our model to the case of a fixed constant recovery rate simply by adjusting the capitals. The default contagion process can then be described as follows. In round k ≥ 1 of the default cascade the set of defaulted institutions is
In particular, D 0 ⊆ D 1 ⊆ · · · and the chain of default sets stabilizes at round n − 1 the latest. We hence denote the final default set by D n := D n−1 . Note that the only randomness in this process stems from the random links in the network. Once a network configuration has been fixed the whole default contagion sequence is fully determined. The following two remarks address interesting possible extensions of our setting.
Remark 2.1. In the following we use the fraction of finally defaulted institutions n −1 |D n | as a measure for the severity of a given shock in the network. It makes sense, however, to not only consider the finally defaulted institutions but to introduce a parameter s i ∈ R +,0 of general systemic importance for each bank i ∈ [n] and use S n := n −1 i∈Dn s i to measure the severity of the shock. Since the systemic importance values s i do not influence the process (2.2), all our results can be extended to this more general setting under mild assumptions on {s i } i∈ [n] . See [22] for the special case R = T = 1 resp. Remark 3.6 for the general setting.
Remark 2.2. To model realistic financial networks with general exposure values, it would be a priori necessary to choose R very large and our model would become very high-dimensional. Instead of considering an edge-weight r as the exposure between two institutions, however, one can also interpret it as a more general factor of impact. It is then possible to model unbounded exposure distributions also with a considerably small choice of R. More precisely, we can assign to each institution i ∈ [n] a list of exchangeable random variables and take the sum over r-many of them to compute the exposure of an edge with impact r. All the main results of this paper can be generalized to this setting by conditioning on the order of defaults in the network. Also see [23] for a precise discussion of this idea for the one-impact case.
Regular Vertex Sequences
In the previous subsections we introduced several parameters and in particular, any random ensemble is described by the weight sequences w −,r,α := (w −,r,α 1 , . . . , w −,r,α n ) and w +,r,α := (w +,r,α
The setting described so far puts us in the position to model a system with a given number n of institutions. However, as already described in the introduction, our main focus is in studying how the complex structures in the underlying network affect the contagion process and, more generally, the (in-)stability of the system as a whole. Towards this aim we proceed as follows. Instead of restricting our attention to a single system configuration, we consider an ensemble of systems that are similar, where the structural similarity is measured precisely in terms of the joint empirical distribution of all parameters that we consider. In particular, we assume that we have a collection of systems with a varying number n of institutions with the property that the sequence (F n ) n∈N of empirical distributions converges. Definition 2.3 (Regular vertex sequence). A sequence (w −,r,α (n), w +,r,α (n), c(n), α(n)) n∈N of model parameters for different network sizes n ∈ N is called a regular vertex sequence if the following conditions are satisfied. Note that we do not specify the ranges of r and α to keep the notation concise. Here and in the following we always mean r ∈ [R] and α ∈ [T ]. 
Note that if we extract the subnetwork of edges with weight r going from banks of type α to banks of type β we are exactly in the setting of [22] with limiting in-weight W −,r,β and out-weight W +,r,α (each of them scaled to account for the changed number of banks). We hence derive the following corollary of [22, Theorem 3.3] which gives some intuition about the geometry of the described random graph in our model. where ζ r,β,α ∓ := E W ∓,r,β 1{A = α} . In particular, the r-out/in-degree with respect to banks of type α of some uniformly chosen bank of type β converges in distribution to Poi W ±,r,α ζ r,β,α ∓ .
Asymptotic Results
This section presents results for the final default fraction n −1 |D n | triggered by some set of initial defaults, which is one of the main contributions of this paper, see Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.1, we first introduce some functions that will play an important role. For the sake of readability, most of the -mainly technical -proofs of this section are moved to the appendix.
Preliminaries
Denote in the following V :
. In the following, the functions f r,α,β : R V +,0 → R, (r, α, β) ∈ V , and g : R V +,0 → R +,0 will play a central role. They are given by
We begin by investigating some basic but important properties of these functions. Proof. Continuity follows from Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem noting that the integrands are continuous in z and bounded by the integrable random variable W +,r,α resp. by 1. Monotonicity of f r,α,β follows directly from the monotonicity of the Poisson-probabilities.
and S is an intersection of closed sets, S is in fact compact. Note that clearly 0 ∈ S. In general S might consist of several disjoint, compact, connected components. Let in the following S 0 denote the component (i. e. the largest connected subset)
The following lemma shows that in fact z * ∈ S 0 and it can hence be thought of as the maximal point of S 0 . Further it identifies z * as a joint root of all the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , and shows the existence of a smallest joint rootẑ. It will turn out later (see in particular Theorem 3.4) that the final fraction n −1 |D n | is intimately related to these two (typically coinciding) joint roots of the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V . Lemma 3.2. There exists a smallest joint rootẑ ∈ R V +,0 of all the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , in the sense thatẑ ≤z componentwise for all joint rootsz. Further, z * as defined above is a joint root of the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , and bothẑ ∈ S 0 and z * ∈ S 0 .
The lemma identifies z * as the maximal joint root of f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , in S 0 . However, if S 0 S, then there will exist joint rootsz ∈ S 0 such that z * ≤z componentwise.
Oftenẑ and z * will coincide and then Theorem 3.4 below will show that the final default fraction n −1 |D n | converges to g(ẑ) in probability. But in some pathological situations this is not the case and Theorem 3.4 will yield a lower bound on n −1 |D n | in terms ofẑ and an upper bound in terms of z * . Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show two-dimensional examples of f . In both examples, we chose R = 2 and T = 1. In the first example, we further chose all weights to be 1 and the capital of each bank to be 3 with probability 80% respectively 0 with probability 20%. The functions f 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) := f 1,1,1 (z 1 , z 2 ) and f 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) := f 2,1,1 (z 1 , z 2 ), where z 1 := z 1,1,1 and z 2 := z 2,1,1 , then have a unique joint root, i. e.ẑ = z * . In the second example, we chose all weights to be 2 and the capital of each bank to be 3 with probability ≈ 94.14% respectively 0 with probability ≈ 5.86%. In this case, there exist two distinct joint rootsẑ = z * in S 0 . Atẑ, the root sets of f 1 and f 2 do not cross each other but only touch.
The next lemma provides two sufficient criteria to check if a joint root, such asẑ, equals z * . These depend on the (weak) directional derivatives of f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , and are hence natural extensions of the stable fixed point assumption in previous literature such as [3, 22, 23] . Figure 2 : Plot of the root sets of the functions f 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) (blue) and f 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) (orange) for two different example networks.
The Main Result for the Final Default Fraction
We now provide an asymptotic formula for the final default fraction n −1 |D n | in terms of function g and the joint rootsẑ and z * . See Section 6.3 for the proof.
Theorem 3.4. Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and letẑ and z * be the smallest respectively largest joint root in S 0 of the functions {f r,α,β } (r,α,β)∈V . Then
In particular, ifẑ = z * , then n −1 |D n | = g(ẑ) + o p (1). 
The same reasoning allows to derive an upper bound in terms of z * . Remark 3.6. As mentioned in Remark 2.1, in many situations it makes sense to measure the damage caused by a shock event to the whole system not simply by counting finally defaulted banks but to weight them according to some systemic importance value s i , i ∈ [n]. If the empirical distribution of {s i } i∈[n] converges in distribution and mean to a random variable S, then in analogy to Theorem 3.4, the total systemic importance of finally defaulted banks S n := i∈Dn s i is lower bounded by n(g S (ẑ) + o p (1)) and upper bounded by n(g S (z * ) + o p (1)), where
Resilient and Non-Resilient Networks
In the previous section we derived results that allow us to determine the typical final default fraction in large financial systems caused by an exogenous shock. Another important question from a regulator's point of view that we study in this section is whether a given system in an initially unshocked state is likely to be resilient to small shocks or susceptible to default cascades. Note that for some fixed financial network (W −,r,α , W +,r,α , C, A) all information about the initial shock stems from C and by "initially unshocked" we mean that c i > 0 for all i ∈ [n]. We model small shocks to the system by an ex post infection in the following sense: we introduce indicators m i ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [n], with the meaning that (the initially solvent) bank i becomes insolvent if m i = 0. This amounts to setting its capital to c i m i . In analogy to Definition 2.3 we assume regularity of {m i } i∈[n] (jointly with the rest of the parameters) and we denote by M the limiting random variable of ex post infection. In particular, the financial system shall be described by the random vector (W −,r,α , W +,r,α , C, A, M ) with P(C = 0) = 0 and P(M = 0) > 0. Denote by D M n the random final default set that M triggers and by (f M ) r,α,β , g M and (z * ) M the analogues of f r,α,β , g respectively z * with C replaced by CM .
From a regulator's point of view a desirable property of a financial system is the ability to absorb small local shocks M without larger parts of the system being harmed. In our asymptotic setting, we can even choose M arbitrarily small and we call a system resilient if the final default fraction n −1 |D M n | tends to 0 as P(M = 0) → 0. If on the other hand n −1 |D M n | is lower bounded by some positive constant, we call the system non-resilient (see Definition 4.3 below). We say that a sequence of events (E n ) n∈N holds with high probability (w. h. p.) if P(E n ) → 1, as n → ∞. Definition 4.1 (Resilience). A financial system is said to be resilient if for each > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all M with P(M = 0) < δ it holds n −1 |D M n | ≤ w. h. p. It will turn out that the resilience of the system strongly depends on the form of the set S 0 which was introduced in Subsection 3.1. Our first result is a criterion guaranteeing resilience.
Theorem 4.2 (Resilience Criterion). Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and assume that S 0 = {0}. Then the system is resilient. Figure 3 shows a two-dimensional example satisfying the condition in Theorem 4.2. We chose R = 2, T = 1, W ±,1 = W ±,2 = 1 and C = 3. It can be seen from the figure that small shocks (here 5% of all banks) do only cause small jumps of the smallest joint root of f 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) = f 1,1,1 (z 1 , z 2 ) and f 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) = f 2,1,1 (z 1 , z 2 ), where z 1 := z 1,1,1 and z 2 := z 2,1,1 . On the other hand, concerning the characterization of non-resilient networks, a difficulty that arises is that the ex post shock M possibly targets only certain subnetworks. More precisely, if
Consider for example a financial network consisting of banks of two types which are isolated of each other. Further, one of the two subnetworks shall be resilient, whereas the other one is non-resilient (in the sense of Definition 4.3 (b)). In order for the whole system to experience large damage, it is then necessary that M does not only infect banks in the resilient subsystem but also in the non-resilient one. This explains why we have to differentiate between different choices for M in the following to fully understand non-resilience in our model. i∈D M n s i . Let us start by considering the special case that M infects every part of the system (i. e. a shock onṼ ). This is the case for example if M is independent of type A, vertex-weights W ±,r,α and capital C. We can then formulate a corollary of Theorem 4.7 following later: T = 1, weights W ±,1 = W ±,2 = 3/2 and capital C = 2. The figure shows the jump of the smallest joint root from 0 to above z * for any small shock (here 10% of all banks).
We now aim to describe non-resilience with respect to shocks on I Ṽ . That is, we
shows that z 0 (I) is the smallest joint root of f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , that is stable with respect to shocks in the I-coordinates. We can state a general theorem for non-resilience in terms of z 0 (I), where I denotes the set of coordinates impacted by M . Theorem 4.7 (Non-Resilience Criterion). Consider a financial system described by a regular vertex sequence and any ex post infection M with E[W +,r,α 1{A = β}1{M = 0}] > 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ I, where ∅ = I ⊆Ṽ . Then w. h. p. n −1 |D M n | ≥ g(z 0 (I)). If z 0 (I) = 0, then g(z 0 (I)) > 0 and the system is thus non-resilient with respect to shocks on I.
By Theorem 4.7 we derive for shocks onṼ that for any > 0 w. h. p. n −1 |S M n | ≥ g(z 0 (Ṽ ))− while in Corollary 4.5 we claimed n −1 |S M n | ≥ g(z * ) − w. h. p. By the following lemma the two are in fact equivalent. The identity z 0 (I) = z * on the other hand does not necessarily imply I =Ṽ .
Applications
The theory developed in the previous sections allows to investigate many interesting novel settings as compared to the present literature. In this section, we discuss some of them and highlight their implications. Further, we demonstrate the applicability of our asymptotic results also for finite networks of reasonable size by numerical simulations.
In the first example, we investigate the influence of a non-resilient subsystem in a global system. Unsurprisingly the global system turns out to be non-resilient as well and we can further show that even resilient network parts become non-resilient by their connections to the nonresilient subsystem, i. e. every howsoever small infection that occurs only within the resilient part of the system finally spreads to a lower bounded fraction of the resilient subsystem.
Example 5.1. For simplicity assume R = 1 and denote z α,β := z 1,α,β , f α,β (z) := f 1,α,β (z) and W ±,α := W ±,1,α in the following. Consider then a 1-type banking system, described by the random vector (W − ,W + ,C), where P(W + > 0) = 1 and P(C = 0) = 0, and assume that it is non-resilient. In the 1-dimensional case this breaks down to the existence ofz 0 > 0 such that
Now introduce a second (possibly resilient) subsystem to the network. That is, the system is now described by the random vector (W ±,1,1 , W ±,1,2 , W ±,2,1 , W ±,2,2 , C, A), where P(C = 0) = 0, A ∈ {1, 2} and α i = 1 means that bank i ∈ [n] is in the non-resilient subsystem, whereas α i = 2 means that i is part of the second subsystem. In order for the characteristics of the non-resilient subsystem to be preserved, we require that W −,1 | A=1 d =W − , W +,1 | A=1 d =W + /P(A = 1) (to account for the changed number of banks; due to the multiplicative form in (2.1) it is sufficient to adjust either in-or out-weights by P(A = 1)) and C| A=1 d =C.
We derive that In fact, if we assume that W +,2 | A=1 > 0 almost surely and P(W −,1 > 0, C < ∞, A = 2) > 0 (that is, there are some banks in the second subsystem lending to banks in the non-resilient subsystem), then it must hold that
and hence the lower bound (5.1) is strictly positive. That is, every howsoever small infected fraction in the non-resilient subsystem spreads to a lower bounded fraction of finally defaulted banks in the second subsystem as well. Now finally assume that W +,1 | A=2 > 0 almost surely and P(W −,2 > 0, C < ∞, A = 1) > 0 (that is, there are some banks in the non-resilient subsystem lending to banks in the second subsystem). By considering the function
we derive that (ẑ M ) 1,2 > 0 for any ex post infection M such that P(M = 0, A = 2) > 0 (that is, infecting some banks in the second subsystem) and hence also (ẑ M ) 1,1 > 0 by the form of f 1,1 (z) (see above). By the same means as before, we hence conclude that in factẑ M ≥ z 0 (I) and so the lower bounds derived above still hold. In particular, this means that every howsoever small initial shock to the second (possibly resilient) subsystem causes the default of a lower bounded fraction of banks in the second subsystem. That is, by connecting to the non-resilient subsystem the a priori possibly resilient second subsystem becomes non-resilient as well.
To better understand the phenomenon in Example 5.1, consider the following example: Let
for w 1 > 1 and w 2 > 0. It is then easy to confirm that the type-1 subsystem is in fact nonresilient and the type-2 subsystem resilient. (Both subnetworks are Erdös-Rényi random graphs.
In the first subnetwork every edge is contagious, in the second none is.) Additionally, we assume P(A = 1) = P(A = 2) = 1/2 and W ±,1 | A=2 = W ±,2 | A=1 = w 3 > 0. In particular,
and hence it must hold that z 2,1 0 (I) = (2w 1 ) −1 w 3 z 1,1 0 (I) resp. z 1,2 0 (I) = (2w 2 ) −1 w 3 z 2,2 0 (I). The problem then reduces to f 1 (z 1 , z 2 ) = 0 and f 2 (z 1 , z 2 ) = 0, where z 1 := z 1,1 , z 2 := z 2,2 and
Depending on the choice of the weights w i , i = 1, 2, 3, the system shows slightly different behavior, as illustrated in Figures 5(a) , 5(b) and 5(c). In all cases, z 0 (I) = z * = 0 which determines a strictly positive lower bound on the final default fraction as shown in Example 5.1. However, z * shows a jump discontinuity at certain choices for the weights w i , i = 1, 2, 3, where in particular (z * ) 2 changes drastically. Revisiting the definition of z 2 = z 2,2 , this can be interpreted as the resilient subsystem suddenly experiencing a lot more defaults. See [37] for similar results on the Erdös-Rényi random graph. Since all the main results of this article and the derivations in Example 5.1 are asymptotical, we demonstrate the applicability for finite networks numerically: For each of the scenarios (a)-(c) in Figure 5 we performed 10 4 simulations on networks of varying size n ∈ {100k : k ∈ [100]} with 1% initially defaulted banks. The outcomes are plotted in Figure 6 together with the theoretical asymptotic final default fraction (taking into account the initial default fraction of 1%). For case (a) except for 6 simulations at n = 100 all results lie considerably close to the theoretical final fraction of ≈ 87.98% and their deviation becomes smaller the larger n grows. For case (b) and n < 10 3 some of the simulations ended in final default fractions around 55%. (Graphically these come from deviations of the hump (root set of f 2 , orange) in Figure 5 (b) such that it intersects with the root of f 1 (blue)). For all other simulations and especially for n ≥ 10 3 , the simulation results clearly converge to the theoretical value of ≈ 94.25%. For case (c), finally, some of the simulation outcomes for n ≤ 500 were close to 0 and few around ≈ 92.63% (the value if one plugs in the largest of the three joint roots into g). The majority of the simulations (in particular for n ≥ 4000), however, resulted in final default fractions close to the theoretical value of 50.02% and again deviations decrease as n increases. Altogether we conclude that already for finite networks of a few thousand vertices our asymptotic results are applicable with good accuracy.
In particular, what we learn from Example 5.1 is that in order to ensure resilience of a particular subsystem, one needs to completely prohibit links to other non-resilient subsystems. It is, however, also possible that two subsystems which are resilient on their own form a non-resilient global system once connected to each other. It is therefore an interesting regulatory question how to ensure also resilience of a global system composed of various resilient subsystems. In general for our model the answer to this question is provided by Theorem 4.2. However, in the following example we state a more intuitive criterion. In [23] explicit capital requirements (i. e. a formula for C| A=α in dependence of W −,α | A=α ) were derived for the case of Pareto distributed weights (which are typically observed in real networks) which ensure (5.2). Now further assume that there exists a constant K < ∞ such that
for all α = β ∈ [T ], i. e. the tendency of institutions to develop links with institutions outside their subnetwork is bounded by a constant multiple of their tendency to develop links with institutions within their subnetwork. In particular this is the case if the external weights are bounded from above and the internal weights are bounded from below. Replacing W ±,β | A=α by KW ±,α | A=α only makes the system less resilient (if the weights increase, the number of links increases and hence the total exposure of each institution). Hence setW ±,β | A=α = KW ±,α | A=α for α = β andW ±,α | A=α = W ±,α | A=α . Now define v ∈ R by v α,β = K 1{α =β} , α, β ∈ [T ]. Then we derive that for α = β and z β,
for all δ > 0 small enough. It thus holds z * ≤ lim δ→0+ δv = 0 and therefore S 0 = {0}. We can then apply Theorem 4.2 and obtain that the combined system is still resilient. From a regulatory perspective it is hence enough to impose capital requirements described by (5.2) and to restrict links between different subsystems in the sense of (5.3).
In our first two examples we concentrated on the (non-)resilience of multi-type networks. For simplicity, we assumed that all edges carry the same weight (R = 1). Another interesting feature of our model, however, is that it allows for edge weights that depend on the types of both the creditor and the debtor bank. The following example shows that this can indeed make a huge difference as compared to previous models in which exposures (edge weights) could only depend on the size/degree/type of the creditor bank. It considers two very similar financial systems whose only difference is that in one exposures depend on both the creditor and debtor type and in the other they depend on the type of the creditor bank only. As a consequence the first system will turn out to be non-resilient whereas the second one is resilient.
Example 5.3. Consider a network of size 2 ≤ n ∈ N in which (asymptotically) p = 1/3 of all banks have type 1 and the remaining 1 − p = 2/3 banks have type 2. That is, T = 2. Further assume that for each pair of vertices (i, j) ∈ [n] 2 an edge from i to j shall be present with probability 4/n. Edges between two banks of type 1 shall carry weight 2 and all other edges weight 1. That is, if α i = 1, then w Then similarly as for Example 5.1 the originally eight-dimensional system reduces to
See Figure 7 (a) for an illustration of the root sets of f 1 and f 2 . This figure already shows that z * = 0 and hence non-resilience by Theorem 4.7. Also for z 1 , z 2 → 0, we can compute
which rigorously proves that the type-1 subnetwork and then also the whole system is non-resilient (cf. Example 5.1). Numerically one derives that z * ≈ (0.601, 1.153) and g(z * ) ≈ 0.877. In order to test this prediction, we performed 10 4 simulations of financial networks of size n = 10 4 with initial default probability 10 −3 . In only 5.32% of the simulations, we observed a resilient nature in the sense that the simulated final default fraction was lower than 3%. All of the remaining simulations ended with a final default fraction within [85.65%, 89.73%] and are hence of a nonresilient nature. Averaging over the latter ones yields a mean final default fraction of 87.71%. Now consider the following modified network: Instead of assigning weight 2 to all links between two type-1 banks and weight 1 to all other links, this time assign weight 2 with probability p to any edge going to a type-1 bank (all other edges are assigned weight 1). That is, we keep the skeleton of the network but we redistribute the edge-weights in such a way that they do only depend on the creditor bank and not on the debtor bank. The total number of weight-2 edges stays the same (note that in the first network the type-1 banks accounted to a fraction of p of all the debtor banks of type-1 banks). This can be achieved by assigning the following new vertexweights: w +,1,1
All other vertex-weights shall stay the same. The new system then reduces to the following two functions, whose root sets are shown in Figure 7 (b): Figure 7 (b) shows that the root set of f 2 is being shifted to the left, now starting off above the root set of f 1 . One can hence already expect that S 0 = {0} and the new system is resilient. Also more rigorously, as z 1 , z 2 → 0, we derive that
The directional derivatives D v f 1 (0) and D v f 2 (0) thus exist for every v ∈ R V + . Choose then for example v = (v 1 , v 2 ) = (1, 1) such that D v f 1 (0) = −1/9 and D v f 2 (0) = −1. From Lemma 3.3 we thus derive that z * = 0 and hence S 0 = {0}. This allows us to apply Theorem 4.2 and hence the modified system is indeed resilient. Again this can be validated numerically. On the same skeleton as for the previous simulation but with random edge-weights as described above the simulated final default fractions are now all within the interval [0.11%, 0.63%] with an average of 0.20%. The system is hence indeed of a resilient nature.
Although Example 5.3 is too simple to model a real financial network, it still shows that counterparty-dependent exposures may have a significant impact on the stability of the system. In general it is also possible that they increase stability of the system, however.
Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs of our results in Sections 3 and 4. Theorem 3.4 will be proved in two steps. At this the underlying ideas are similar to [22] but at a considerable number of steps novel methods have to be used and we will particularly discuss them in detail. We use the notation ≥ 0 is the smallest value such that f 1,1,2 (z 2 ) = 0. Again it is possible to find such z 1,1,2 2 by the intermediate value theorem since f 1,1,2 is continuous, f 1,1,2 (z 1 ) ≥ 0 and f 1,1,2 (z 1 + (0,ẑ 1,1,2 , 0, . . . , 0)) ≤ 0. Since z 1 ∈ S 0 , by Lemma 3.1 it then holds f r,α,β (z 2 ) ≥ f r,α,β (z 1 ) ≥ 0 for all (1, 1, 2) = (r, α, β) ∈ V . In particular, z 2 ∈ S 0 .
• z i , i ∈ {3, . . . , RT 2 }, are found analogously, changing only the corresponding coordinate.
RT 2 is the smallest value such that f 1,1,1 (z RT 2 +1 ) = 0, which is again possible by the intermediate value theorem. In particular, it still holds z 1,1,1 RT 2 +1 ≤ẑ 1,1,1 . As before also z RT 2 +1 ∈ S 0 .
• Continue for z i , i ≥ RT 2 + 2.
The sequence (z n ) n∈N constructed this way has the following properties: It is non-decreasing in each coordinate and (z n ) n∈N ⊂ S 0 . Further, it is bounded inside [0,ẑ]. Hence by monotone convergence, each coordinate of z n converges and soz = lim n→∞ z n exists. Now suppose there is (r, α, β) ∈ V such that f r,α,β (z) > 0. By continuity of f r,α,β then also f r,α,β (z n ) > for some > 0 and n large enough. This, however, is in contradiction with the construction of the sequence (z n ) n∈N since f r,α,β (z n ) = 0 in every RT 2 -th step. Hence f r,α,β (z) ≤ 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . Alsoz ∈ S 0 , however, since this is a closed set. Hence f r,α,β (z) ≥ 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and altogether this shows thatz is a joint root of all functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V . Now turn to the proof that z * ∈ S 0 and it is a joint root of all functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V : First define the following sets for each > 0:
Further denote by S 0 ( ) the connected component of 0 in S( ). By the same procedure as forẑ above, we now derive that there exists a smallest (componentwise) pointẑ( ) ∈ S 0 ( ) such that f r,α,β (ẑ( )) = − for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . Clearly,ẑ( ) is non-decreasing in (componentwise) and hencez := lim →0+ẑ ( ) exists (we will show thatz = z * in fact). Now by monotonicity of S 0 ( ), we derive thatẑ(δ) ∈ S 0 (δ) ⊆ S 0 ( ) for all δ ≤ . Since S 0 ( ) is a closed set, it must thus hold that alsoz = lim δ→0+ẑ (δ) ∈ S 0 ( ) for all > 0 and in particular,z ∈ >0 S 0 ( ). Further, by continuity of f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V , we derive that >0 S 0 ( ) ⊆ >0 S( ) ⊆ S. Moreover, >0 S 0 ( ) is the intersection of a chain of connected, compact sets in the Hausdorff space R V and it is hence a connected, compact set itself. Since it further contains 0, we can then conclude that >0 S 0 ( ) ⊆ S 0 and thusz ∈ S 0 .
We now want to show that z ≤z componentwise for arbitrary z ∈ S 0 . This clearly proves z = z * . It thus suffices to show S 0 ⊂ [0,ẑ( )]. Then z ≤ẑ( ) and z ≤ lim →0+ẑ ( ) =z. Hence assume that S 0 ⊂ [0,ẑ( )]. By connectedness of S 0 we findz ∈ S 0 withz r,α,β ≤ẑ r,α,β ( ) for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and equality for at least one coordinate. W. l. o. g. let this coordinate be (1, 1, 1) . By monotonicity of f 1,1,1 with respect to z r,α,β for every (r, α, β) = (1, 1, 1) , we thus derive that
However, we also assumed thatz ∈ S 0 and hence f 1,1,1 (z) ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Finally, we obtain that f r,α,β (z * ) = f r,α,β (z) = lim →0+ f r,α,β (ẑ( )) = lim →0+ (− ) = 0, by continuity of f r,α,β . Hence z * is in fact a joint root of all the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V .
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Note that it is sufficient to construct a sequence (z n ) n∈N ⊂ R V + such that lim n→∞ z n =z and f r,α,β (z n ) < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V , n ∈ N. By monotonicity of f r,αβ from Lemma 3.1 it then follows that z * ≤ z n and hence z * ≤z. If condition 1. is satisfied, we get lim n→∞ nf r,α,β z + n −1 v = D v f r,α,β (z) < 0 and we can hence choose z n :=z + n −1 v.
If condition 2. is satisfied, note that by Fubini's theorem for n > ∆ −1 we derive
and lim sup n→∞ nf r,α,β z + n −1 v ≤ (1 − κ)v r,α,β < 0. Thus choose z n :=z + n −1 v again.
Proof of the Main Result for Finitary Weights
In this section, we consider the special case that the vertex weights w r,α,β i and capitals c i can only take values in a finite set. To formalize this, consider the following definition: That is, in a finitary system there is a partition of the set of all institutions into T J(c max +2) sets. In particular, in this case all weights w ±,r,α i are bounded from above by some constant w ∈ R + and hence by Dominated Convergence we can compute the partial derivatives of f r,α,β :
where δ a,b := 1{a = b}. Hence for any vector v ∈ R V , the directional derivative of f r,α,β in direction v is given by the following continuous expression:
We can then prove the following asymptotic results for the final default fraction in the network. Proposition 6.2. Consider a financial system described by a finitary regular vertex sequence and letẑ be the smallest joint root of the functions {f r,α,β } (r,α,β)∈V . Then it holds that n −1 |D n | ≥ g(ẑ) + o p (1). If additionally there exists v ∈ R V + such that D v f r,α,β (ẑ) < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V , then n −1 |D n | = g(ẑ) + o p (1).
See Figure 2(a) for an example where such v ∈ R V + exists respectively Figure 2(b) for an example where it does not. Theorem 6.3 below will analyze systems of the latter type as well.
Proof. We begin by proving the lower bound: As in [22] and [23] we switch to a sequential default contagion process. The idea is to collect defaulted institutions and instead of exposing them all at once (as in (2.2)), only select one defaulted institution uniformly at random in each round t ≥ 1 and expose it to its neighbors (draw edges). Using the finitary assumption, it is then sufficient to keep track of the following sets and quantities during the default process: Let h(t) := (u α (t), c α j,m,l (t), w r,α,β (t)) and H(t) = (h(s)) s≤t . Then for n large enough such that all p r i,j < R −1 (possible by finitary weights), the expected evolution of the system at time t is E c α j,m,l (t + 1) − c α j,m,l (t) H(t)
The expressions on the right-hand side are all Lipschitz functions of u α (t), w r,α,β (t), c α j,m,l (t) as long as β∈[T ] u β (t) is bounded away from zero. All the remaining conditions in Wormalds theorem [46] can be checked by similar means as in [22] . We can thus uniformly approximate In particular, note that α∈[T ] ν α (τ ) = g(z(τ )) − τ and µ r,α,β (τ ) = f r,α,β (z(τ )). Thus for τ <τ , it holds f r,α,β (z(τ )) = n −1 w r,α,β ( τ n ) + o p (1) ≥ 0 + o p (1) and by letting n → ∞, it follows f r,α,β (z(τ )) ≥ 0. By continuity of z(τ ) and z(0) = 0, hence z(τ ) ∈ S 0 . Further, f r,α,β (z(τ )) = µ r,α,β (τ ) = n −1 w r,α,β ( τ n ) + o p (1) ≤ n −1 wu β ( τ n ) + o p (1) = wν β (τ ) + o p (1) and as n → ∞, f r,α,β (z(τ )) ≤ wν β (τ ).
As τ →τ , β∈[T ] ν β (τ ) → 0 and hence by continuity of z(τ ), f r,α,β (z(τ )) = 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . Again by continuity of z(τ ) and closedness of S 0 , we then conclude that z(τ ) ≥ẑ. In particular,
Hence, we are left with showing thatt/n ≥τ + o p (1) in order to prove the first part of the theorem, wheret denotes the first time that α∈[T ] u α (t) = 0. Define X n := ( τ n ∧t)/n −τ . Thent/n ≥τ + X n . Further, for > 0 and n large enough such thatτ − τ n /n ≤ , we obtain
ν α (τ ),t/n <τ ,
In order to prove the second part, we first want to show that the existence of v implies that in fact z(τ ) =ẑ. To this end, assume that z(τ ) =ẑ. Then there exists (r, α, β) ∈ V and δ > 0 such that z r,α,β (τ ) >ẑ r,α,β + δv r,α,β . Without loss of generality assume that z r,α,β (τ ) is the first coordinate that reachesẑ r,α,β + δv r,α,β , that is there exists τ δ ∈ [0,τ ] such that z(τ δ ) ≤ẑ + δv componentwise and z r,α,β (τ δ ) =ẑ r,α,β + δv r,α,β . But by D v f r,α,β (ẑ) < 0 and continuity of D v f r,α,β (z), we then derive for δ > 0 small enough that 0 > f r,α,β (ẑ + δv) ≥ f r,α,β (z(τ δ )), where we used monotonicity of f r,α,β from Lemma 3.1. This contradicts that f r,α,β (z(τ )) ≥ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,τ ] and hence it must hold that z(τ ) =ẑ. In particular, g(ẑ) =τ (cf. (6.7)).
The difficulty in the following is that the system is only described by the functions γ α j,m,l (τ ), ν α (τ ) and µ r,α,β (τ ) as long as τ <τ , the first time at which α∈[T ] ν α (τ ) = 0. Wormald's theorem makes no statement about the system at or afterτ , however. The idea is hence the following: We let τ be the first time at which µ r,α,β (τ ) ≤ v r,α,β for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and choose a sequence ( n ) n∈N ⊂ R + such that n → 0 as n → ∞. We then consider the cascade process as before for the first τ n n steps and we show that the number of remaining defaults R n divided by n converges to 0 in probability as n → ∞. In particular, this will show that n −1 |D n | = n −1t = n −1 ( τ n n + R n ) ≤ τ n + n −1 R n ≤τ + o p (1) = g(ẑ) + o p (1).
In order to show n −1 R n = o p (1), we will expose the defaulted banks round by round as in (2.2), i. e. we expose the banks in α∈[T ] U α ( τ n n ) at once and so on. However, banks with w +,r,α i = 0 for all r ∈ [R] and α ∈ [T ] will never infect any new banks. Thus, we only need to consider banks with r∈[R] α∈[T ] w +,r,α i > 0 in the following. Since we are in a finitary setting, this means that there exists w 0 > 0 such that r∈[R] α∈[T ] w +,r,α i ≥ w 0 for all banks. Taking into account also banks with total out-weight of zero only causes an extra bounded factor for R n .
For each solvent bank at step τ n n there are two possible ways to default: Either there is one exposure to a defaulted bank that is larger than the remaining capital at step τ n n (the bank defaults directly) or there are at least two exposures to defaulted banks that add up to an amount larger than the remaining capital (the bank defaults indirectly). Therefore, for α ∈ [T ] and l ≥ 1 we define the following sets:
: α i = α and i defaults directly in the l-th round after step τ n n } I α l = I α l (τ n ) = {i ∈ [n] : α i = α and i defaults indirectly in the l-th round after step τ n n } Further, let T α l = D α ∪ I α . In particular, R n = α∈[T ] l≥1 |T α l (τ n )|. Further, the following quantities will play an important role: We can hence find c 1 < 1 such that for all (r, α, β) ∈ V it holds j,mw
By (6.1) and possibly slightly increasing c 1 , we then derive that j,mw
on a σ(h( τ n ))-measurable set Ω n such that lim n→∞ P(Ω n ) = 1 for every > 0. Further, by the definition of τ and (6.3), we can choose Ω n in such a way that n −1 w r,α,β ( τ n ) ≤ 2 v r,α,β holds on Ω n for all (r, α, β) ∈ V . We can then compute on Ω n n −1 E D r,α,β 
where C := 4T 2 (R + 1) 2 w 3 v 2 ∞ . In particular, for > 0 small enough we find c 2 ∈ (0, 1 − c 1 ) such that C 2 ≤ 2 c 2 v r,α,β for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and hence on Ω n it holds that
Let then c := c 1 + c 2 ∈ (0, 1). We continue inductively: Assume that on Ω n it holds for l ≥ 1 that n −1 E T r,α,β l h( τ n ) ≤ 2 c l v r,α,β . We then derive on Ω n that In fact, it also holds that W −,s,γ ζ s,β,γ < C > 0, using that f r,α,β n (z * ( n )) = f r,α,β n+h (z * ( n +h)) = 0. The proof is hence finished, ifẑ( n ) = z * ( n ). Otherwise, note the following: For each δ > 0 it holds f r,α,β n (ẑ( n + δ)) < f r,α,β n+δ (ẑ( n + δ)) = 0. By monotonicity of f r,α,β n from Lemma 3.1, we derive that z * ( n ) ≤ẑ( n +δ) ≤ z * ( n +δ). Hence as δ → 0, using that z * ( n +δ) → z * ( n ) by Lemma 6.4, we conclude that alsoẑ( n +δ) → z * ( n ) as δ → 0. Thus we derive that for δ n > 0 small enough, it holds D v( n) f r,α,β n+δn (ẑ( n + δ n )) < 0 by continuity of D v f r,α,β (z) w. r. t. and z. Hence apply Proposition 6.2 to the financial systems additionally shocked by n + δ n and choose vectors v( n ) for the directional derivative.
Proof of Theorem 3.4
In the previous section we derived an explicit asymptotic expression for the final default fraction if in our model we choose vertex-weights only from a finite set. While this gives a first important insight into the behavior of large financial networks, it is not possible to model heavy tailed degree distributions as observed for real financial networks by bounded vertex-weights. Theorem 3.4 hence extends Theorem 6.3 to the case of general (non-finitary) regular vertex sequences.
The outline for the rest of this section is the following: We want to approximate the general regular vertex sequence by two sequences of finitary vertex sequences such that one of them describes a system that experiences less defaults and the other one experiences more defaults. and {F B j } j∈N approximate F from above respectively below and the approximations become finer as j increases. Since every h ∈ H is continuous in z, x and y, it is easy to obtain (cf. [22] ) that for each k ∈ N there exists j k large enough such that for all j ≥ j k it holds clearly correspond to discrete weight sequences that can be obtained from the original regular vertex sequence by adjusting weights upward respectively downward. However, F A,B k (potentially) still assigns mass to infinitely many weights and capitals. For the case of F A k , we can overcome this issue by setting
where · ∧ k denotes componentwise truncation at k. That is, if the capital or one of the weights of some bank in the system exceeds k (we call this bank large in the following), then in the approximating finitary system described by F A k , this bank's weights are all set to 0 and its capital is increased to ∞ (cf. [22] for a rigorous definition of the approximating vertex sequences). Note that the type of each bank stays the same. Clearly, this further reduces defaults in the system in the sense that if we couple the original system with the finitary approximating system, then the final default fraction n −1 D A k n is stochastically dominated by n −1 |D n | for all k ∈ N. If we wanted to apply exactly the same idea also to F B k , we would need to set all weights of large banks to ∞, which is not possible by the definition of a finitary regular vertex sequence. Still it will be possible to adjust weights and capitals of large banks to finitely many values such that the final default fraction in the finitary approximating system stochastically dominates Let then F B k be given by F B k on D k . By this definition we know that it holds F B k (k, . . . , k, β) = F (k, . . . , k, β) for each β ∈ [T ] and hence P(A = β, C < ∞) − P(A B k = β, C B k < ∞) = γ β k . We can thus assign mass γ β k to the points (0, w k , 0, β). That is, if a large bank of type β originally has finite capital, then its approximated capital is set to 0 (it initially defaults), its in-weights are set to 0 and its out-weights are set to w r,α,β k (again cf. [22] for a rigorous definition of the approximating vertex sequences). As before, their type does not change. Finally, we assign the remaining mass P(A = β, C = ∞) to the points (0, 0, ∞, β) for each β ∈ [T ].
By construction, all large banks are initially defaulted in the approximating finitary system. Also all the weights of small banks are increased as compared to the original system. To show that there occur more defaults in the approximating system than in the original one (i. e. n −1 D B k n stochastically dominates n −1 |D n |), all that is left to show is that for each r ∈ [R] the total r-out-weight of the large banks with respect to each type α ∈ [T ] in the approximating system is larger than in the original one. But the total r-out-weight of the large banks with respect to type α is given by o p (1) ).
Hence for each small bank i ∈ [n] the number of incoming r-edges from large banks in the original system is stochastically dominated by the corresponding number in the approximating system (for more details see [22] ). In particular, the total exposure of i to the set of large banks (the weighted sum of incoming edges) is stochastically dominated. This shows the following: Lemma 6.5. Consider a regular vertex sequence and let sequences {F A k } and {F B k } be constructed as above. Further let D A k n and D B k n be the sets of finally defaulted banks in the finitary approximating systems. Then with denoting stochastic domination it holds that
We have hence bounded the final default fraction n −1 |D n | from below and from above using finitary approximations. We now want to compute the precise final default fractions for these approximating systems using Theorem 6.3. Let Further let z ∈ R V +,0 be defined by z r,α,β := inf z∈D z r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V . Then in particular, z ≤ẑ componentwise sinceẑ ∈ D . Further, z is clearly increasing componentwise as → 0. Hence the limitz := lim →0 z ≤ẑ exists. Now note that for fixed (r, α, β) ∈ V , by definition of z , we find a sequence (z n ) n∈N ⊂ D such that lim n→∞ z r,α,β n = z r,α,β and z n ≥ z componentwise. By monotonicity and uniform continuity of f r,α,β on D , we then get f r,α,β (z ) ≤ f r,α,β (z 1,1,1 n , . . . , z r,α,β , . . . , z R,T,T n ) = f r,α,β (z n ) + o(n) ≤ + o(n) and hence f r,α,β (z ) ≤ . Again by continuity of f r,α,β , we obtain f r,α,β (z) = lim →0 f r,α,β (z ) ≤ lim →0 = 0. Replacingẑ byz in the proof of Lemma 3.2, we now get the existence of a joint rootz ≤z of all the functions f r,α,β , (r, α, β) ∈ V . Sinceẑ is the smallest joint root by definition, it thus follows thatz =ẑ. Now note that by (6.8) for k large enough we derive that (f A k ) r,α,β (z) ≥ f r,α,β (z) − for all z ∈ Z. Further, by construction of F A k , it holds that (f A k ) r,α,β (z) ≤ f r,α,β (z). In particular, we can conclude thatẑ A k ∈ D for k large enough and henceẑ A k ≥ z . Thus, for each > 0 by (6.8) we derive lim inf k→∞ g A k (ẑ A k ) ≥ lim k→∞ g A k (z ) = g(z ). Finally, using continuity of g and lim →0 z =ẑ, we get the first statement:
If now as in the proof of Theorem 6.3 z * ( ) is the largest joint root of the additionally shocked system, we derive by (6.9) that for k large enough it holds f B k r,α,β (z * ( )) ≤ f r,α,β (z * ( ))/2 < 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V and hence (z * ) B k ≤ z * ( ) componentwise. (Assume E[W +,r,α 1{A = β}] > 0 for all (r, α, β) ∈ V such that f r,α,β (z * ( )) < 0. Otherwise, we can simply leave out the coordinates z r,α,β in all the proof since the (r, α, β)-coordinate of all joint roots will be 0.) Again by (6.9), we then derive lim sup k→∞ g B k (z * ) B k ≤ lim k→∞ g B k (z * ( )) = g(z * ( )) and by letting → 0, lim sup k→∞ g B k (z * ) B k ≤ g(z * ).
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Let > 0. By Lemma 6.5, we obtain P n −1 |D n | − g(ẑ) < − ≤ P n −1 D A k n − g(ẑ) < − .
Further, by Lemma 6.6, for k large enough, we have g A k (ẑ A k ) > g(ẑ) − /2 and hence P n −1 |D n | − g(ẑ) < − ≤ P n −1 D A k n − g A k (ẑ A k ) < − /2 . Applying Theorem 6.3 to the finitary system, as n → ∞ we derive P n −1 |D n | − g(ẑ < − ) → 0, which shows the first part of the theorem. Similarly, for the second part, by Lemma 6.5 P n −1 |D n | − g(z * ) > ≤ P n −1 D B k n − g(z * ) > and by Lemma 6.6, for k large enough it holds that g B k ((z * ) B k ) < g(z * ) + /2. Hence an application of Theorem 6.3 yields that P n −1 |D n | − g(z * ) > ≤ P n −1 D B k n − g B k ((z * ) B k ) > 2 → 0, as n → ∞.
Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let γ ∈ (0, 1) and define (f γ ) r,α,β (z) := (1 − γ)f r,α,β (z) + γ ζ r,α,β − z . Further, let S γ := (r,α,β)∈V {z ∈ R V +,0 : (f γ ) r,α,β (z) ≥ 0} and denote by S γ 0 the largest connected component of S γ containing 0. Finally, define z * (γ) by (z * ) r,α,β (γ) := sup z∈S γ 0 z r,α,β . By the proof of Lemma 6.4 we know that z * (γ) → 0, as γ → 0, and hence also g(z * (γ)) → 0, using continuity of g. Choose now γ > 0 small enough such that g(z * (γ)) ≤ /3 and δ > 0 small enough such that (f M ) r,α,β (z) < (f γ ) r,α,β (z) uniformly for all 0 ≤ z ≤ ζ componentwise and P(M = 0) < δ. Then in particular (z * ) M ≤ z * (γ) and g((z * ) M ) ≤ g(z * (γ)) ≤ /3.
If we now possibly decrease δ such that δ ≤ /3, then by Theorem 3.4, we derive for the final fraction of defaulted banks in the shocked system n −1 |D M n | that w. h. p. Let nowz ∈ T (I) arbitrary. Then there exists a sequence (z k ) k∈N ⊂ R V +,0 with f r,α,β (z k ) < 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ I respectively f r,α,β (z k ) ≤ 0 for (r, α, β) ∈ V \I such that lim k→∞ z k =z. By finiteness of I, we can then find k > 0 such that f r,α,β (z k ) ≤ − k 1{(r, α, β) ∈ I} for any (r, α, β) ∈ V and k ∈ N. In particular, z k ∈ T ( k , I) and hence z k ≥ẑ( k , I) ≥z. As k → ∞, we can thus conclude thatz ≤z for anyz ∈ T (I) and hencez ≤ z 0 (I). On the other hand, z(I) ∈ T (I) by definition and thereforez(I) = z 0 (I).
Finally, note that z 0 (I) = lim →0+ẑ ( , I) ∈ >0 S 0 ( , I) = S 0 , where the last equality follows from >0 S 0 ( , I) ⊂ S and that >0 S 0 ( , I) must be a connected set containing 0 since S 0 ( , I) is a chain of connected, compact sets containing 0.
Proof of Theorem 4.7. Letẑ M denote the analogue ofẑ for the ex post shocked system. Then In particular, g(z 0 (I)) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.8. By Lemma 4.6 clearly z 0 (Ṽ ) ≤ z * . Assume now that z 0 (Ṽ ) z * . Then for some (r, α, β) ∈Ṽ it must hold z r,α,β 0 (Ṽ ) < (z * ) r,α,β and by the construction of z 0 (Ṽ ) in the proof of Lemma 4.6 we can find > 0 such that z r,α,β 0 (Ṽ ) ≤ẑ r,α,β ( ,Ṽ ) < (z * ) r,α,β . Now by the definition of z * and connectedness of S 0 , we find S 0 z ≤ẑ( ,Ṽ ) such thatz r,α,β =ẑ r,α,β ( ,Ṽ ). But then f r,α,β (z) ≤ f r,α,β (ẑ( ,Ṽ )) = − < 0 which contradictsz ∈ S 0 .
